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Abstract 
 In the late 1990s, the Air Force eliminated over 200 KC-135 navigators, leaving 
50 remaining for the aircraft’s most complex Special Operations Air Refueling (SOAR) 
mission.  As the Air Force unveils the KC-46 Pegasus, this mission will continue but 
without a position for the navigator.  Instead, navigators will undergo divestment as the 
SOAR mission transfers to the KC-46.  Current plans indicate navigators will not only 
remain as the KC-46 arrives, but inbound navigators will continue arriving until 2018.  
This thesis applies the Delphi method, a process eliciting analysis anonymously from a 
panel of experts, in order to examine the elements affecting KC-135 navigator divestment 
and offer a more effective, comprehensive solution.  Ultimately, the panel of experts 
arrived at conclusions supporting the hypothesis that navigator divestment and SOAR 
transition should occur sooner, rather than later, in order to secure a future for current 
navigators, ensure responsible development of Air Force officers, and enable the complex 
SOAR mission to endure.  In order to best achieve these results, the experts 
recommended halting all inbound navigator assignments, reassigning navigators at a 
conservative rate over the next several years, and beginning a SOAR transition program 
to replace the tanker navigator with a third pilot concept. 
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PRAGMATIC DIVESTMENT OF KC-135 NAVIGATORS IN THE  
SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIR REFUELING MISSION 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
Background 
Over the past half century, the United States Air Force made significant progress 
in the advancement of warfighting capabilities for its aircraft fleet.  Perhaps the most 
substantial innovation was the development of the Global Positioning System (GPS).  
The application of the GPS to triangulate aircraft position increased navigation precision 
and, over time, contributed to a decreased need for the navigator crew position on many 
aircraft.  In fact, this decreased navigator need, teamed with an increasingly antiquated 
training program, prevented many navigators from reaching their full career potential.  
Therefore, in 2004 the Air Force transformed the navigator role into the Combat Systems 
Officer (CSO) and created a modernized training program which enabled more crew 
integration and the ability to operate complex systems (Chapman 2005). 
Navigators on the KC-135 Stratotanker realize the effects of avionics 
advancement and the decreased need for their Major Weapons System (MWS) role all 
too well.  Between 1997 and 2001, the KC-135 was outfitted with a sophisticated upgrade 
called “Pacer CRAG,” where CRAG stood for compass, radar, and GPS (Clarke 1999).  
This enhancement eliminated positions for navigators on all but the most complex 
missions, and 203 of the originally funded 254 aviators were removed between 1996 and 
2000 (Deivert 1994).  The disheartening aspect of this reduction involved an assignment 
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system which could not handle reallocation of over 200 navigators in such a short time.  
Consequently, most of these officers were eliminated from the Air Force entirely. 
The navigators which remained on the KC-135 after the completion of the 
transition to primarily three-person crews in 2001 were specifically retained to fly Special 
Operations Air Refueling (SOAR) missions.  These missions were considered the most 
complicated and demanding on the crew, necessitating the fourth crew member.  
However, even at the end of the Pacer CRAG upgrade, the need for a navigator on these 
SOAR missions was scrutinized.  According to Major Robert Deivert, a global mobility 
expert, this additional manpower could be another pilot, boom operator, or even a flight 
engineer (1994). 
Today, the Air Force is again revisiting the question of what to do with KC-135 
navigators.  The replacement to the Stratotanker, the KC-46 Pegasus, is scheduled for 
delivery in 2017 and is not retrofitted with a navigator suite (2013, Aviation).  This thesis 
will discuss some feasibility studies with respect to the Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) 
options to replace the navigator.  However, Air Force leadership currently proposes a 
third pilot construct to perform the role and fulfill SOAR duties on the new aircraft.  
Additionally, present plans involve delaying the divestment of KC-135 navigators and 
transition of the SOAR mission until KC-46 delivery. 
Problem Statement 
According to Colonel Michael Bauer, Chief of Air Mobility Command’s Combat 
Operations Division, current SOAR transition plans necessitate inflow of CSOs from 
Specialized Undergraduate Navigator Training (SUNT) according to Table 1 below.   
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Table 1.  Inbound Navigator Manning Pipeline 
Fiscal Year 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Number of Inbound Navigators 10 10 10 5 0 
 
This plan was designed to parallel the transition of the KC-135 to the KC-46, a beddown 
with a Primary Aircraft Inventory (PAI) and Backup Aircraft Inventory (BAI) schedule 
depicted in Table 2 below (AMC PPLAN 14-01 2014). 
Table 2.  McConnell AFB KC-135 Drawdown/KC-46A Beddown Schedule PAI/BAI 
Type FQ1/16 FQ2/16 FQ3/16 FQ4/16 FQ1/17 FQ2/17 FQ3/17 FQ4/17 
 KC-135 44/11 40/11 36/11 36/7 36/7 32/5 28/3 24/3 
 KC-46 0 3/0 5/0 7/0 10/0 14/0 18/0 21/0 
Type FQ1/18 FQ2/18 FQ3/18 FQ4/18 FQ1/19 FQ2/19 FQ3/19 FQ4/19 
 KC-135 24/3 24/3 18/4 12/5 12/5 12/2 12/2 12/2 
 KC-46 24/0 24/0 24/0 24/0 28/0 32/0 36/0 36/1 
 
While this proposal is achievable, it generates an unnecessary amount of risk by 
assuming KC-46 aircraft will not encounter problems absorbing the SOAR mission.  
According to AMC PPLAN 14-01, Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) will 
not commence until the third fiscal quarter of 2016 (2014).  This permits only a short 
window to determine and correct any incompatibilities between the KC-46’s 
communications suite and required SOAR Command and Control (C2) equipment.  
Additionally, these schedules pose manpower and career development concerns by 
sending young navigators into terminating jobs at a time when they most need to develop 
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airmanship skills.  Lastly, since inbound navigators are scheduled through 2017 and   
KC-46 beddown is scheduled to complete in 2019, the proposed timeline suggests the Air 
Force Personnel Command’s (AFPC) assignment system will again find itself flooded 
with a large number of KC-135 navigators in a short period of time.  Based on the Air 
Force’s decision to eliminate over 200 navigators in the late 1990s, history suggests the 
assignment system cannot handle such a demand efficiently. 
Research Questions 
The purpose of this thesis is to answer the question, “What is the best manner in 
which to handle the divestment of KC-135 navigators and the transition of the SOAR 
mission?”  In order to refine AMC’s current transition plan, it is necessary to examine the 
problem from several vantage points using a systems approach and examine multiple 
courses of action to effectively and efficiently remove navigators from the KC-135 
SOAR mission while minimizing costs.  The resulting recommendation must deliver a 
cradle to grave Manpower, Personnel, and Training (MPT) blueprint for the elimination 
of KC-135 navigators, as well as a training program for an additional SOAR crew 
member.  In light of the Department of Defense’s (DoD) shrinking budget, these plans 
must underscore cost savings in the Air Force’s best interests. 
Investigative Questions 
In order to meet these research objectives, several questions must be explored.  
These investigative questions consider SOAR transition ramifications from many angles, 
including Air Force Instruction (AFI) revisions, personnel and training costs, Unit 
 5 
Manning Document (UMD) updates, navigator career implications, who should absorb 
the navigator’s existing duties, and how training should be handled.  Table 3 lists the 
questions which must be researched in order to present a comprehensive navigator 
divestment and SOAR transition plan. 
Table 3.  Investigative Questions 
# Question 
1 How should navigators be divested from the KC-135? 
2 What are potential manpower, personnel, and training effects after navigators are 
phased out? 
3 What is the most feasible replacement for navigators in the SOAR mission?  What are 
the cost implications? 
4 What changes are required to Air Force regulations to transition the SOAR mission? 
5 How will the Unit Manning Document (UMD) need to be restructured to support the 
new SOAR construct?  
6 How will navigator replacements be trained and SOAR certified? 
7 How will the assignment system handle KC-135 navigators from various year groups? 
 Where will they go?  How will they accrue gate months? 
Methodology Overview 
In order to obtain sufficient information to address the aforementioned 
investigative questions, the Delphi Process will be employed.  Much of the research 
identifying AMC’s current transition plan relies on interviewing key staff personnel to 
obtain information.  Based on a series of sequential questionnaires delivered to these 
experts independently, the Delphi methodology will elicit information and expert 
opinions to draw group conclusions without the burden of group think.  The Delphi 
technique “eliminates committee activity altogether, thus further reducing the influence 
of certain psychological factors, such as specious persuasion, the unwillingness to 
abandon publicly expressed opinions, and the bandwagon effect of majority opinion.  
This technique replaces direct debate by a carefully designed program of sequential 
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individual interrogations (best conducted with questionnaires) interspersed with 
information and opinion feedback derived by computed consensus from the earlier parts 
of the program” (Brown 1968).  Additionally, anonymity of experts in this research is 
vital to obtain objective analysis without bias due to military rank, position, experience 
level, or reputation.  Due to the nature of this research and forecasting involved, the 
Delphi Process is the best method to elicit valuable insight and arrive at a conclusion. 
Hypothesis 
 The results of this research may suggest halting the inbound pipeline of navigators 
to the KC-135, expediting conversion of the SOAR mission to a certified third pilot 
operator construct, and reassigning navigators through normal attrition.  The elimination 
of navigators may require manpower reorganization involving decreasing the number of 
KC-135 squadrons qualified in the SOAR mission from four to three.  While it is not 
expected to encounter problems training navigator replacements and changing applicable 
regulations and AFIs, the most challenging aspect of the anticipated outcome will most 
likely involve where to send current KC-135 navigators in order to satisfy normal career 
progression, meet aviation service requirements, and maximize utility given the Air 
Force’s significant training investments.  Lastly, since it is expected the vast majority of 
the SOAR mission will be absorbed internally with minimal training, personnel, and 
flying costs, there will be a significant cost savings from eliminating navigators sooner, 
rather than according to AMC’s proposed timeline. 
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Assumptions/Limitations 
AMC’s transition plan for the SOAR mission is closely tied to the transition of the 
KC-135 to the beddown of its replacement, the KC-46.  While there are significant 
matters to investigate regarding SOAR capabilities on the KC-46, this thesis is scoped to 
examine SOAR transition and navigator divestment independent of KC-46 changeover.  
The only way this research relates to the KC-46 is to illustrate the potential risk 
mitigation of shifting the SOAR mission to a non-navigator operator prior to KC-46 
delivery, rather than at the same time. 
Other limitations on this research involve restricted access to classified SOAR 
documents and limited access to privileged information outside of the author’s leadership 
chain.  Such information includes, but is not limited to, detailed manpower projections 
and force reduction data from AFPC, assignment system impacts of Air Staff strategic 
decisions like potential U-28 and MC-130P phase-outs, and already programmed 
budgetary decisions including annual funding for SUNT trainees.  While arguments are 
based on the best available and accessible data, it is possible other factors exist which 
inform AMC Staff plans and decisions. 
Expected Contributions 
The conclusions of this thesis are intended to shape the body of knowledge 
relating to force management of aircrew personnel in the Air Force.  History reveals the 
Air Force has struggled with large-scale manpower decisions, typically spending 
significant amounts of money both reducing and increasing the size of the force.  Too 
often, the increases have been too aggressive and the reductions too severe (Kitfield 
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2012).  The waves created by these actions cause significant problems for aircrew and are 
extremely inefficient, especially considering the substantial training investment for pilots 
and navigators.   
From a training standpoint, the Air Force will always require a certain number of 
instructors to train the inbound student pipeline.  When that instructor corps is cut, the 
void is filled by younger, less experienced aircrew.  Therefore, more risk is accepted, and 
the force is eventually hollowed.  Aside from these training implications, however, it is 
also important to consider the inefficiency of cutting fully trained and developed aviators 
and replacing them with new trainees.  The results of this thesis are intended to address 
these possible inefficiencies by determining whether waste exists in the KC-135’s 
proposed SOAR transition plan and if so, to suggest an alternative approach which more 
robustly and resourcefully meets the Air Force’s needs. 
Preview of Thesis 
This thesis begins by investigating current manpower, personnel, and training 
research, the future of the Air Force CSO, and historical KC-135 manning reductions in 
the Chapter II Literature Review.  This review will lay out background information and a 
framework which informs research analysis.  After exploring the current body of 
knowledge relating to the thesis topic, Chapter III will discuss how the overall research 
question and investigative questions will be answered, including who will replace KC-
135 navigators, how they will be replaced, and where they will go.  Using those Chapter 
III methodologies, the research questions will be thoroughly evaluated in Chapter IV’s 
analysis and results.  Finally, after carefully piecing together the thesis results, Chapter V 
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will offer the author’s comprehensive plan for the divestment of KC-135 navigators and 
transition of the SOAR mission.  This conclusion will judiciously assess AMC’s current 
proposals and assert the author’s findings for the best way forward in the interests of the 
Air Force. 
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II. Literature Review 
Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the current body of knowledge in 
academic literature related to the divestment of aircrew from a MWS.  Since this thesis is 
comprehensively scoped to examine manpower divestment, skillset transition, and officer 
development, the literary review also encompasses a broad spectrum of topics.  Included 
in this chapter are data points and key findings on life cycle costs which impact 
manpower decisions, risks incurred during rated aircrew divestment and skillset 
reallocation, and future development opportunities for Air Force navigators. 
Manpower, Personnel, and Training Life Cycle Costs 
The most important factors impacting how and when to transition personnel 
enduring human capital divestment are cost and mission effectiveness.  While the Air 
Force historically invests substantial sums of money to ensure units are always effective 
in accomplishing the mission, the question during times of austerity and while balancing 
priorities with scarce resources becomes “What is the acceptable level of effectiveness, 
and at what cost?”  While KC-135 navigators were specially trained for the unique SOAR 
mission, the discussion at hand is whether the chosen navigator replacements conducting 
this duty will be as effective and at what fiscal and opportunity costs to delaying 
navigator divestment.  The Delphi method will explore expert analysis regarding 
effectiveness of navigators and their proposed third pilot replacements.  However, 
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previous studies and research exist which explain life cycle costs due to manpower, 
personnel, and training. 
According to Philbert Cole, Jr., Senior Acquisition Advisor at DynCorp 
International, “Life cycle cost is the most important determinant of new aeronautical 
systems acquisitions.  Operating and support (O&S) costs are 40% to 60% of life cycle 
cost.  Manpower, personnel, and training average 65% to 75% of O&S costs” (1991).  
Many think of life cycle costs as all of the infrastructure and resources required to 
support the life of a weapon system but fail to realize the weapon system, in this case a 
KC-135, is not just the aircraft.  Integral to this system and its associated life cycle cost 
are its operators whose manning and training are dependent upon numerous additional 
support agencies like aircrew flight equipment, training, scheduling, and readiness 
personnel.  Therefore, Cole states the MPT portion of O&S life cycle cost is the largest 
and most complex (1991).  The elements of MPT are defined in Figure 1 below (Cole 
1991). 
 
Figure 1.  MPT Defined 
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 As Cole indicated, the computation of MPT is complicated.  Fortunately, the costs 
incurred to train brand new navigators and pilots are available.  Error! Reference source 
not found. details these variable and fixed MPT costs according to Mr. Mark Parsons 
from Headquarters Air Education and Training Command’s office of Financial 
Management (2014, AETC).  It is important to note that navigator initial qualification 
training is conducted “in-house” at McConnell Air Force Base, and is therefore not 
included in the AETC computation.  At first glance, the cost of Specialized 
Undergraduate Pilot Training (SUPT) per pilot is about double the cost of primary 
Combat Systems Officer (CSO) training, formerly known as Specialized Undergraduate 
Navigator Training (SUNT).  Strictly in terms of cost, it appears prudent to retain 
navigators for as long as possible if required to replace them on a one-for-one basis. 
Table 4.  Initial Aircrew Training Costs Per Graduate 
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 Clearly the cost to train and equip a pilot is greater than for a navigator.  
However, it is important to also investigate how the number of aircrew required is 
determined in the first place and whether transitioning the SOAR mission from 
navigators to pilots necessitates the same number of pilot replacements.  These planning 
factors are driven by information reported in the Status of Resources and Training 
System. 
Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) 
AFI 10-201 requires measured units to report their readiness in terms of resources 
and training.  According to Major Paul Orth, “SORTS indicates a unit’s ability to undertake 
its full wartime mission as defined in the Designed Operational Capability (DOC) Statement” 
(2008).  This DOC Statement is the source document which drives a unit’s resource and 
training requirements and is either associated with Unit Type Codes (UTCs) or a Unit 
Manning Document (UMD) to define manpower needs.  On a monthly basis, a unit 
assesses its ability to meet the capabilities outlined in the DOC Statement and reports an 
overall category level to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff using the following 
definitions outlined in Figure 2 (AFI 10-201 2013).  Appendix A illustrates an example 
DOC Statement. 
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Figure 2.  SORTS Category Levels 
 Ideally, a measured unit reports C-1, indicating it is capable of conducting all of 
its tasked missions.  However, in times of austerity this is often difficult to achieve.  It is 
even more difficult to maintain this capability during turbulent resource transitions and 
acquisition beddown, which sometimes necessitates a C-5 assessment.  While the overall 
C-Level is relevant to the SOAR transition discussion, examining the structure of the 
DOC Statement is more informative to illustrate the number of navigators, or their 
replacements, required to accomplish the mission.   
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 A DOC Statement for a flying Wing is very specific in terms of personnel, 
equipment, and training requirements, as well as normal and surge requirements for 
aircraft generation.  In order to determine how many aircrew positions are required to 
accomplish the mission, two pieces of information are required: the number of 
permanently assigned aircraft (PAA) and the crew ratio.  Since a unit must account for 
administrative requirements like temporary duties, leave, and sickness, the Major 
Command determines an appropriate “crew ratio” for aircrew manning (Cole 1991).  This 
crew ratio is multiplied by the PAA and the crew complement to determine required 
manning levels for each aircrew position. 
 In the DOC Statement for the 22d Air Refueling Wing (22 ARW), the unit solely 
responsible for the KC-135 SOAR mission, SOAR crews are comprised of two pilots, 
one navigator, and 1.25 boom operators.  More specifically, for every four SOAR crews 
assigned, the 22 ARW is authorized eight pilot, four navigator, and five boom operator 
manning billets.  The 22 ARW also has nuclear and traditional air refueling missions 
which do not include a navigator in their crew complements.  While the 22 ARW is 
manned to meet maximum tasking requirements for all three of its designated missions, it 
is extremely unlikely it would ever be tasked at maximum capacity for all three 
simultaneously.  Therefore, due to the significant number of pilots assigned to the wing to 
accomplish all three of its missions, the required crew complement for pilots could 
effectively remain the same, rather than increase, when the navigator requirement is 
eliminated.  In other words, flexibility allows for utilization of a pilot as a copilot one day 
and a “third pilot” the next, or even as a copilot for a portion of a flight and a “third pilot” 
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for another portion of the flight.  The transition does not necessarily call for a one-for-one 
navigator replacement, but an analysis of manpower utilization is beneficial to determine 
the proper crew ratio. 
Dynamic Manpower Reallocation 
Decisions involving how best to structure units, balance levels of effort, and 
maximize productivity often involve many variables, some measured objectively and 
others derived subjectively.  Lieutenant Colonel Brent French, a mobilization expert, 
published an article titled “Decision Framework for Dynamic Manpower Reallocation” 
which defines a manner in which to assess utilization of manpower across units.  He 
presents the decision framework as consisting of two dimensions: a utilization factor and 
a utility function (2007, French).  He then describes these two dimensions: 
The utilization factor is used to develop a burden index, useful in 
comparative analysis and answering the question, “Are some of my units 
working disproportionately longer hours than others?” The utility function 
then provides the commander the tools to decide, “Should I temporarily 
augment an overused unit with manpower from an underused unit?” (2007). 
More specifically, the utilization rate is defined as the percentage level of effort, where 
0% means manpower present for duty completely fail to provide any work output while 
100% indicates the maximum possible man-hour output with manpower available.  The 
utility factor, on the other hand, is defined as the mission impact of manpower 
reallocation.  While the utilization factor and utility function are associated with units in 
this case, one can apply the framework to members within unit, as well, like pilots and 
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navigators.  French suggests taking into consideration manpower available, the situation, 
and the schedule to determine utilization factor.  Table 5 illustrates calculations of 
various utilization factors for several work schedules. 
Table 5.  Output and Utilization Factors for Various Schedules (2007, French) 
 
The inputs determining utilization factor ultimately enable the calculation of a “burden 
index” to recommend which units or personnel should be considered for reallocation 
before determining the more subjective utility function (2007).  Figure 3 plots these 
burden indices to suggest which personnel should be considered for manpower 
reallocation based on schedules in Table 5. 
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Figure 3.  Plot of Relative Burden Indices 
 Ultimately the utility function, or mission impact, is the overarching factor 
driving the decision of whether or not to reallocation manpower.  French keys in on three 
variables which affect mission impact in terms of dynamic manpower reallocation: risk of 
either leveling or not leveling manpower, transition burden, and duration.  This decision 
framework is illustrated in Figure 4, where “leveling” means balancing manpower across 
units to yield equivalent workload (2007).  While the risk of leveling relates to shortfalls 
and loss of utility due to reallocation of personnel away from a unit, the risk of not 
leveling accounts for the cost of not reallocating resources.  Duration relates to how long 
the reallocation is necessary, and the transition burden “considers the level of training 
required, the periodicity of the training, the physical resources required to perform the 
task, and the re-transition burden when the temporary duty is complete (2007). 
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Figure 4.  Dynamic Manpower Reallocation Decision Framework 
 One can apply the decision framework for dynamic manpower reallocation to the 
restructuring of pilots in place of KC-135 navigators.  In terms of the SOAR transition, 
the risk of not leveling is the cost incurred by either not replacing navigators or by 
delaying the transition.  The risk of leveling is the utilization lost by reallocating pilots 
away from traditional pilot duties when serving in the traditional SOAR navigator role.  
The duration in this case is indefinite, and the transition burden encompasses all of the 
training and resources required to develop a suitable SOAR navigator replacement. 
Officer Development for Rated Air Force Navigators 
As previously stated, the decision framework for manpower reallocation involves 
the risk of not leveling as a critical decision variable; in other words, either not replacing 
or delaying the replacement of navigators.  A large component of this risk involves 
officer development of navigators.  Quite simply, the longer the Air Force waits to 
transition the KC-135 navigator career field, the more likely the transition period will be 
shortened.  Since the Air Force’s assignment system relies on manning projections and 
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specific positions becoming available at a steady pace, issues often arise when the system 
is flooded in a short period of time, like when the Air Force eliminated over 200 
navigators by the year 2000 because there were no suitable positions available (Deivert 
1994).  Thereafter, the Air Force is forced to either inefficiently eliminate rated officers, 
in whom it has invested large sums of money for training, development, and experience, 
or to stall careers due to lack of suitable assignments available.  Arguably, the latter is 
just as inefficient since it causes many officers to resign their commissions.  Rebecca 
Grant, president of IRIS Independent Research, stated, “Over the last 10 years, the 
transition to a much smaller fleet with diverse taskings has turned rated management into 
a roller coaster whose ups and downs affect the force for years to come” (2014). 
Rated aircrew management, which includes pilots, navigators, and air battle 
managers, seeks to meet current operational needs while building future leaders (Grant 
2014).  In order to build those future leaders, the Air Force postures experienced aviators, 
defined as those who have attained over 500 flight hours, in management positions at the 
Wing level and above (Grant 2014).  Some of these coveted positions include staff billets 
at major commands, combatant commands, the Joint Staff, the Pentagon, and at Air Force 
Headquarters (Grant 2014).  Due to additional supervisory staff and safety duties, Grant 
estimates experienced aircrew should fill between 45% and 55% of a flying squadron’s 
manning billets (2014).   
Over 10 years ago, Air Force senior leadership identified that for some time 
navigators were prevented from reaching their full career potential, and the lack of 
navigators in the general officer ranks suggested their training programs were antiquated 
 21 
(Chapman 2005).  In other words, over time this out-of-date training led to devaluing of 
the navigator crew position and decreased leadership development opportunities.  
According to General Donald G. Cook, former Commander of Air Education and 
Training Command, “We have for too long in our Air Force undervalued the potential 
and the capability and the abilities of our navigators” (2005).  Since current Air Force 
navigators, or Combat Systems Officers, now experience a modernized training program, 
it will be interesting to see if the trend senior leaders recognized 10 years ago continues, 
and management of the KC-135 navigator transition will serve as a clear indicator. 
The dilemma of career progression for Air Force navigators is not new.  In fact, to 
grasp a better idea of future command opportunities for navigators, taking a look at 
historical observations indicates not much has changed.  In 1989, Lieutenant Colonel 
Larry Magnuson, a Master Navigator with over 3,000 flight hours, authored an Air War 
College study titled “The Future of the Air Force Navigator.”  He indicated command 
opportunities exist, particularly within support squadrons, but the opportunities will only 
persist if three factors hold true: “1) current trends toward navigator commanders 
continue, 2) staff positions increase making the navigator more competitive for all 
commander positions, and 3) the rated supplement opportunities increase providing 
experience necessary to successfully compete for support commander positions” 
(Magnuson 1989).  The 2014 reduction in force significantly decreased staff 
opportunities that must be manned with aircrew officers, called the rated supplement, 
which certainly does not bode well for navigators.  However, Lieutenant Colonel 
Magnuson also remarked, “The path to promotion is an unidentifiable combination of 
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promotions, command, high level staff positions, and timing” (1989).  Further, he stated 
the future of the Air Force navigator s directly affected by pilot manning, the rated 
supplement, staff positions, and technological advancement of aircraft (1989). 
While staff opportunities were significantly slashed in 2014, the proportion of 
billets filled by navigators will remain strong if Air Force leadership decides to retain the 
pool of experienced pilots in operational flying assignments to curtail hollow force 
concerns.  These troubles are alleviated by maintaining enough experience to properly 
develop younger pilots.  Additionally, a surge in commercial airline hiring may cause a 
pilot shortage which frees available staff billets for navigators.  The proportion of these 
staff positions available is historically favorable to navigators.  In 1993, 35% of 
navigators held staff billets while only 24% of pilots served in staff capacities (Magnuson 
1989). 
Lieutenant Colonel Magnuson concluded his research of the future for Air Force 
navigators with a proposal to create a navigator career monitor position.  The 
responsibilities of this position include compiling manpower statistics and liaising with 
major commands, advocating for career development programs, and providing navigators 
with education required to transition to alternate career paths in the Air Force (1989).  In 
fact, transition programs used to exist which enabled rated officers to maintain aircrew 
currency while filling undermanned support positions in maintenance, security forces, 
and logistics.  Known as “Volant Wrench,” “Volant Cop,” “Volant Store,” and “Volant 
Van,” these highly competitive programs enhanced both retainability and career 
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development (Magnuson 1989).  Considering the dire need for Air Force maintenance 
officers, a program like “Volant Wrench” could not be more imperative. 
Summary 
The literature review investigated previous research related to management of 
personnel and training associated with aircrew transition.  It examined findings linked to 
manpower divestment, skillset transition, and navigator officer development through 
studies of major weapons system life cycle costs, readiness reporting, and a decision 
framework for manpower reallocation.  Additionally, a historical analysis of career 
progression and command opportunities for rated navigators illustrated prolonged 
challenges which persist today.  This literature is critical to crafting informed decisions 
which impact how and when KC-135 navigators are divested. 
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III.  Methodology 
Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe how the Delphi process was applied in 
order to solicit and organize results regarding the best ways to divest the KC-135 
navigator force.  Anonymity of selected experts for the study was critical to ensuring 
data, opinions, and results were not skewed.  Therefore, names, duty stations, job titles, 
and ranks are omitted from this discussion. 
Overview of Research Methodology  
 In order to apply the Delphi method, it was necessary to organize strict protocol 
and structure.  This involved a series of steps to formulate a framework.  Ultimately, the 
task at hand encompassed selection of experts, explanation of the topic and Delphi 
process to those experts, formulation of questionnaires, feedback and re-questioning, and 
compilation of results to formulate a group consensus.  In terms of protocol, experts were 
instructed to only communicate the results of their questionnaires through the study’s 
facilitator, refrain from identifying themselves as part of the study, and abstain from 
speaking with peers about their questionnaires.  Structurally, all questionnaire responses 
were transmitted only through the Delphi study facilitator, differing responses were 
relayed between experts, and each expert was instructed his identity would permanently 
remain anonymous. 
The first and most important step was selection of key experts to participate in the 
series of questionnaires.  In order to elicit opinions and information without bias due to 
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organization, rank, or position, these experts were well informed beforehand how the 
process would unfold.  They were informed their identities and any identifiable 
information tied to them would remain confidential before, during, and after the research 
study.  Additionally, experts were not told who was involved in the study, were 
encouraged not to discuss their involvement in the study, and were numbered in order to 
maintain anonymity.  By the end of the first step, five experts were chosen based on 
breadth and depth of experience and knowledge and were assigned identifiers “Expert 1” 
through “Expert 5.” 
The second step of the study established a foundation of where each expert stood 
by initiating the first round of questionnaires using the research questions in Table 3.  
Deliberately, the questions were provided without any supporting data.  This was 
important in order to gather initial opinions from the experts before supplying further 
information in follow-up questionnaires. 
The third step of the study involved identification of varying answers from the 
initial questionnaire, followed by consolidated feedback supported with factual data.  
After each round of questionnaires, any questions with which a consensus was reached 
would be pared out from future questionnaires in order to focus on arriving at 
conclusions.  While desirable to reach unanimous decisions for each of the investigative 
questions, it was important to recognize the possibility one or more experts could 
fervently disagree, regardless of how many rounds of questionnaires and feedback were 
provided.  In this case, after exhausting all means to reach compromise, the question 
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would be omitted from further questionnaires and varying positions would be 
incorporated in the study’s analysis and results. 
The final step of the Delphi method for this research study entailed compiling all 
of the expert opinions and data elicited through the sequence of questionnaires in order to 
draw conclusions.  Since many of the investigative questions involved subjective criteria, 
it was important to document assumptions and limitations.  The final recommendations 
would ultimately encompass a collection of the best analysis agreed upon by the panel of 
experts. 
Assumptions  
 Application of the Delphi method to solicit ideas, information, and opinions from 
the selected experts involves several assumptions.  It is assumed that these participants 
will provide their honest stances to the research questions without pressure to the 
contrary based on their assigned organizations, ranks, or positions.  Additionally, it is 
reasonable to assume information may exist related to the investigative questions which 
the selected experts cannot access or is classified in a manner in which restricts 
disclosure.  While robust feedback is desired for this investigative study, it is also 
important to consider the limitation that expert subjects may fail to provide timely and 
thorough analysis due to time constraints caused by their jobs. 
Description of Analyses 
 Unlike studies which involve significant quantitative analyses through statistics, 
modeling, simulations, and calculations, this study lends itself more toward the use of 
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qualitative analysis.  A key aspect of this analysis involves the relay of disagreement 
between experts in order to request rebuttals and eventually arrive at a consensus.  While 
the experts may all quickly arrive at the same answer to a particular research question, it 
is possible other questions will demand many rounds of questioning before reaching a 
conclusion.  In order to maintain objectivity and anonymity when gathering responses 
and performing analyses, all responses were relayed verbatim between the experts, and 
hand-written answers were transcribed into printed text.  Additionally, the effect of 
experts abandoning their opinions based on views of the majority was prevented by only 
stating varying beliefs themselves, omitting how many experts offered the differing ideas. 
Summary 
This chapter described how the Delphi process was applied in order to request 
information, analyze it, and arrive at conclusions for the most pragmatic methods for 
divestment of the KC-135 navigator force.  The selected experts remain anonymous 
before, during, and after the study in order to prevent bias in data, opinions, and final 
results.  Therefore, identities of the panel of experts were omitted from the discussion.  
This chapter further outlined the framework with which to question and re-question the 
panel, discussed assumptions and limitations to the provided feedback, and described the 
procedure for processing analysis.  Careful adherence to the Delphi process methodology 
guaranteed the following analysis in as meticulous and unbiased manner possible.
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IV.  Analysis and Results 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter describes and explains the analysis and results derived from a series 
of questionnaires distributed to five experts through use of the Delphi method.  Since this 
study involved an extensive set of investigative questions in order to arrive at a 
comprehensive solution to KC-135 navigator divestment, the results are organized one 
question at a time.  Chapter V conclusions and recommendations summarizes these 
findings and prescribes the best way forward for the Air Force’s transition of the KC-135 
SOAR program and its navigator corps. 
Question 1.  How should navigators be divested from the KC-135? 
This question was the most debated of the investigative questions because it 
concerned timeframe and rate at which navigators should be divested from the KC-135 
community.  Upon initial questioning, Expert 1 and Expert 4 suggested phase out occur 
as close to KC-46 beddown as possible and at an aggressive pace.  Expert 2, Expert 3, 
and Expert 5 recommended halting the pipeline of brand new inbound Combat Systems 
Officers and implementing third pilot SOAR training while divesting navigators through 
normal attrition.  Expert 5 furnished Figure 5, Figure 6, and Figure 7 as possible courses 
of action.  It is important to note Expert 5’s COAs made the assumption a pilot is the 
most practical replacement to the navigator for the SOAR mission, though this 
assumption is further explored in Question 3. 
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Figure 5.  Phased Divestment of KC-135 Navigators 
 The first Course Of Action (COA), initially recommended by Expert 5 generally 
corroborated with the opinions of Expert 2 and Expert 3.  Expert 5 asserted freezing new 
inbounds prevented aviators from training on a MWS with limited development 
opportunity, minimized operational risk to the SOAR mission transition otherwise 
amplified by simultaneous transition to the KC-46, and established a reasonable timeline 
for the Air Force to find new positions for existing navigators.  This COA outlined a 
Small Group Tryout (SGTO) before training pilots in the navigator’s duties and operating 
in parallel until the completion of navigator divestment.  Additionally, Expert 5 
mentioned recoding some of the administrative UMD positions from navigator billets 
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(12M3F) to pilot billets (11M3F) and decreasing the number of flying squadrons at 
McConnell Air Force Base from four to three to eliminate excessive administrative 
overhead. 
 
Figure 6.  Immediate Divestment of KC-135 Navigators 
 A second COA involved a more aggressive and immediate navigator divestment.  
None of the experts deemed this COA prudent due to the risk involved in transitioning 
SOAR too quickly, a likely scarcity of suitable assignment options in such a short 
timeframe, and an expected failure to successfully persuade higher headquarters to adjust 
the SOAR crew ratio.  While this COA was unpopular among the experts, they all agreed 
converting the six administrative UMD positions would maintain more flexibility when 
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the suggested third pilot concept was fully implemented.  Additionally, they agreed at the 
completion of the transition deactivating a flying squadron was necessary to maintain 
proper administrative complements.  Expert 1 further noted that there is a plan to 
deactivate one of the flying squadrons upon KC-46 beddown, regardless of navigator 
divestment.  
 
Figure 7.  Divest KC-135 Navigators During KC-46 Beddown 
 The third COA described by Expert 5 was initially supported by Expert 1 and 
Expert 4.  This plan involved waiting until KC-46 beddown to phase out navigators and 
transition the SOAR mission.  Expert 1 and Expert 4 acknowledged an aggressive 
transition might leave some navigators with limited career options.  However, they 
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claimed it was more costly for the Air Force to replace navigators with pilots.  Though 
navigators and pilots of the same rank and time in service are paid the same salary, 
Expert 4 indicated the initial cost to train a pilot was double that of a navigator and 
increased pilot requirements could additionally drive up flying hour costs.  His 
observation of initial training costs was roughly accurate according to Table 4Error! 
Reference source not found..  Additionally, Expert 1 illustrated the history of significant 
delays to MWS beddowns which he claimed further supported waiting to transition the 
SOAR mission. 
 The main point of contention regarding whether to divest navigators sooner rather 
than closer to KC-46 beddown revolved primarily around life cycle cost and partially 
around development of those officers whose position would be eliminated.  Through 
subsequent re-questioning and supplying the experts with each other’s facts and opinions, 
discussion advanced to new levels.  The experts each expressed their viewpoints whether 
the SOAR mission required a new pilot replacement for each navigator, if it mattered 
how long it takes before KC-46 beddown, and the potential cost incurred by the Air Force 
if navigators were left with few career options and underwent a Reduction In Force (RIF) 
or resigned commissions after fulfilling their active duty service commitments. 
 Expert 2, Expert 3, and Expert 5 maintained their initial stance through re-
questioning and were adamant that earlier navigator divestment could take place at a 
lower cost because a new pilot would not be required to replace each divested navigator.  
In fact, Expert 2 stated the nature of McConnell Air Force Base as a super tanker Wing 
with four flying squadrons enabled it to absorb the SOAR mission with already assigned 
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personnel, regardless of whether six of the fifty navigator positions was converted to a 
pilot billet.  Furthermore, Expert 3 noted the loss of over forty navigators would easily 
result in monetary savings, even with the cost of six additional pilots and associated 
flying hour and MPT costs. 
 Expert 4 was eventually convinced it made fiscal sense to divest navigators 
sooner rather than later, at which point he agreed to the COA for halting the inbound 
pipeline and gradually transitioning SOAR.  However, Expert 1 brought up the Wing’s 
DOC statement and suggested it would drive a one-for-one navigator replacement.  The 
other experts conceded this was the case, as written, but claimed the DOC statement was 
based on an old standard.  A large personnel shift like divestment of an entire crew 
position would dictate a new DOC statement, one with a crew ratio the other experts 
declared would not require more pilots.  While still somewhat unsure, Expert 1 ultimately 
accepted it was possible to rewrite the DOC statement with a new crew ratio for the 
SOAR mission and also acknowledged flooding the assignment system with too many 
navigators all at once could lead to unintended consequences and a loss of experienced 
human capital.  Interestingly, though all five experts eventually supported the phased 
divestment COA, their backgrounds did not appear to bias their initial opinions.  Two 
pilots and one navigator initially supported the COA in Figure 5 while one pilot and one 
navigator initially supported the COA in Figure 7. 
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Question 2.  What are potential manpower, personnel, and training effects after 
navigators are phased out? 
Answers to this question varied significantly but included more additive feedback 
than disputes.  In terms of manpower, the experts agreed the net loss of about one fourth 
of the officers assigned to the 22d Operations Group meant one of the four flying 
squadrons should be deactivated.  Expert 3 indicated it would be difficult and inefficient 
to maintain levels of management in four squadrons with such losses.  Aside from flying 
operations, officers hold key positions enabling training, readiness, standardization and 
evaluation, tactics, scheduling, safety, and executive administrative support.  The experts 
agreed leveling manpower in an efficient manner necessitated operations with three 
flying squadrons instead of four. 
Another manpower consideration concerned changes to authorizations in support 
roles.  While the number of aircraft maintenance personnel is driven by the number of 
permanently assigned aircraft at the installation, support personnel such as aviation 
resource managers, intelligence operators, and aircrew flight equipment specialists are 
driven in-part by utilization.  Though a decrease in navigators signals decreased work 
load for these personnel, Expert 5 suggested changes in UMD authorizations would be 
marginal.  Expert 1 agreed and proposed aviation resource managers would experience 
the largest loss with the deactivation of a flying squadron. 
Speaking to the personnel piece of MPT, Expert 4 asserted there should not be a 
problem with personnel experience levels post-divestment as long as the distribution of 
experienced pilots to inexperienced pilots remained healthy throughout the transition.  In 
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contrast to past Air Force personnel reductions where a disproportionate amount of 
experienced aircrew were eliminated from the force, he pointed out how this divestment 
eliminates all navigators, experienced and inexperienced alike.  The end result would not 
cause what is commonly referred to as the “bathtub” effect, where a shortage of 
personnel with a specific specialty and expertise causes turbulent manpower hurdles for 
years to come. 
Expert 1 and Expert 3 stated training would experience the most significant 
changes during and after navigator divestment.  Most notably, the experts declared the 
eventual shutdown of the navigator formal training unit, as well as contracted instruction 
taught by KC-135 simulator specialists.  Moreover, replacement of navigators called for 
transition of SOAR training from instructor navigators to their replacements.  Expert 2 
suggested this transition would be easier than it sounded.  Based on findings from a 
February 2014 third pilot test case, which involved hands-on SOAR instruction for six 
pilots by instructor navigators on several flights, he was confident a pilot’s undergraduate 
training provided baseline knowledge which reduced the amount of training required.  In 
fact, Expert 2 affirmed training a new pilot in the SOAR mission would only require one 
day of ground training and one hands-on flight.  Furthermore, he advised third pilots, 
presumably those with instructor qualification, could take over instruction of the course 
with as little as 15 hours of SOAR flight experience.  The other experts agreed with 
Expert 2’s assertions with the exception of Expert 5, who summarily agreed but 
suggested 15 hours of SOAR flight experience might be a little too aggressive. 
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Question 3.  What is the most feasible replacement for navigators in the SOAR 
mission?  What are the cost implications? 
Though all of the experts initially agreed based on the importance and complexity 
of SOAR missions that an additional pilot was the most suitable navigator replacement, 
Expert 5 thought it was important to additionally discuss the options of communications 
systems operators (specialty code X3D1X3) and KC-135 boom operators (specialty code 
1A0X1).  He supplied data from AMC which scored ground and flight capabilities for 
alternatives to the SOAR navigator found in Figure 8 and Figure 9. 
 
Figure 8.  AMC SOAR Ground Duty Scoring 
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Figure 9.  AMC SOAR Flight Duty Scoring 
 While AMC’s scoring agreed with initial assertions that a pilot was the most 
appropriate navigator replacement, the experts believed AMC’s scoring was biased and 
vastly underestimated training already incorporated in the pilot program such as radar 
operation, rendezvous, flight planning, and expertise required for staff positions.  Expert 
3 ran separate scoring at the Operations Group level against pilot training syllabi and 
furnished ground and flight capability assessments illustrated in Figure 10 and Figure 11.  
The new scoring largely validated scoring of the communications specialists and boom 
operators but more remarkably illustrated a disparity in AMC’s assessment of pilot 
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abilities versus the Operations Group’s judgment.  The other experts accepted Expert 3’s 
scoring as a more appropriate valuation of navigator replacement aptitude. 
 
Figure 10.  OG SOAR Ground Duty Scoring 
 39 
 
Figure 11.  OG SOAR Flight Duty Scoring 
 The experts questioned reached a consensus that communications specialists 
lacked requisite airmanship and boom operators required substantial additional training to 
fulfill the navigator’s role in the SOAR mission.  Despite the significant cost savings of 
replacing navigators with enlisted operators, the experts agreed these options could not 
ultimately accomplish SOAR mission requirements.  Therefore, the focus of cost shifted 
toward comparing the present cost of navigator employment with the potential cost of 
pilot replacements.  Expert 1 furnished an annual estimate for 2015 as shown in Table 6. 
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Table 6.  Annual Aircrew Cost Estimate 
 
 In Table 6, Expert 1 explained several assumptions were employed to generate a 
basis from which to compare average costs for navigators and pilots.  Of note, estimates 
were based on an aircrew member with an average experience level as a Captain with six 
years of commissioned service and four years of aviation service.  Additionally, initial 
training costs took into account the average annual costs of undergraduate pilot and 
navigator training from Table 4 spread across the associated service commitment 
durations, six years for navigators and ten years for pilots.  Since Operations and 
Maintenance (O&M) flight hours are programmed based on the flight time required to 
train pilots annually, this additional cost was added for each pilot; navigators do not incur 
this cost since their training is not a limiting factor and is accomplished utilizing already 
programmed O&M flight hours.  The other experts agreed the estimates in Table 6 were 
based on reasonable assumptions.  They indicated the COA which recodes six pilots into 
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navigator positions would save the Air Force about $6.5 million annually.  Additionally, 
not accounting for the opportunity costs from failing to retain navigators post-divestment, 
these estimates suggest about 44 pilots could replace the 50 navigators for the same cost. 
Question 4.  What changes are required to Air Force regulations to transition the 
SOAR mission? 
All experts agreed after Air Force level approval of reassignment of navigator 
SOAR duties to a suitable replacement, changes to regulations would follow suit 
relatively quickly and easily.  Expert 3 noted the three parent Air Force Instructions 
(AFI) which delineated SOAR navigator training, evaluation, and flight duties: AFI 11-
2KC-135 Volume 1, AFI 11-2KC-135 Volume 2, and AFI 11-2KC-135 Volume 3.  
While he didn’t believe it was beneficial to the discussion to examine each of the 
multitude of navigator AFI references, he summarized key concepts from the three 
primary AFIs.   
In AFI 11-2KC-135 Volume 1, Expert 3 suggested pilots already accomplish the 
continuation training required for navigators, and the only additional training reference 
involved SOAR.  He indicated the AFI organizes navigator training into three phases: 
basic navigator, SOAR navigator, and instructor navigator.  Of these phases, Expert 3 
stated the basic navigator and instructor navigator phases could be removed entirely after 
SOAR transition, and the SOAR navigator phase would be modified for the pilot’s needs 
along with associated Chapter 4 ground and continuation training requirements.  The 
section defining the SOAR navigator phase is depicted in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12.  SOAR Navigator Training Phase (11-2KC-135V1) 
 The experts agreed AFI 11-2KC-135 Volume 2, would be the simplest to update.  
Expert 3 plainly stated Chapter 3, the instructions regarding navigator evaluations, could 
be removed.  Since SOAR is a certification rather than a qualification, its requirements 
are not evaluated per Chapter 3.  Expert 2 identified two evaluation criteria specific to 
navigators in which pilots are not evaluated: manual gear extension and manual flap 
extension (AFI 11-2KC-135V2 2010).  However, those capabilities were only required 
for initial basic navigator or initial instructor evaluations and are already evaluated for 
boom operators.  All experts agreed it was not necessary to levy these evaluation criteria 
on navigator replacements. 
 The third AFI referenced by Expert 3 regarded KC-135 Operations Procedures in 
AFI 11-2KC-135 Volume 3.  The section defining the navigator’s role was incorporated 
in the KC-135 aircrew complement.  Figure 13 shows how the four-person crew is 
defined for the SOAR mission and outlines in 6.60.4 the duties which would presumably 
be performed by a third pilot replacement.   
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Figure 13.  KC-135 Aircrew Complement (11-2KC-135V3, 124-125) 
Expert 5 additionally mentioned AFI 11-2KC-135 Volume 3, Addenda C, which 
specifically defines SOAR procedures.  Distribution of the Addenda C is limited to those 
read into the SOAR program, but updating it to account for a replacement to the 
navigator would only involve substituting references to the navigator with references to 
the new operator.  All of the experts agreed this contextual crew position name 
replacement was the fundamental modification for each of the AFIs. 
Question 5.  How will the Unit Manning Document (UMD) need to be restructured 
to support the new SOAR construct?  
This question generated the quickest consensus.  Upon initial questioning, each of 
the experts suggested the UMD was more driven by the DOC statement’s crew ratio 
requirements than anything else.  Therefore, any changes to the DOC statement due to 
navigator divestment would drive UMD changes.  However, in the Question 1 discussion 
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of the best courses of action for SOAR transition, the experts all agreed recoding 
administrative navigator positions in the UMD would slightly increase the flexibility of 
pilot replacements when navigator elimination was complete.  These administrative 
positions, often referred to as “attached” positions, create billets for aviators but are not 
considered line flyers.  In other words, the attached positions are filled over and above 
DOC statement requirements.  While only a minor explicit change, the experts reached a 
consensus that six administrative positions held by navigators existed which would be 
suitable pilot positions after SOAR transition.  These UMD authorizations coded with a 
navigator 12M3F AFSC would be changed to a pilot 11M3F AFSC. 
Question 6.  How will navigator replacements be trained and SOAR certified? 
Answers to this question initially varied significantly.  Expert 2 and Expert 3 
broadly stated navigator replacements should attend formal certification course 
conducted exclusively by the 22d Operations Group SOAR staff unit, including both 
ground and flight training.  Expert 1 did not initially weigh in on who would conduct the 
instruction, but believed the training was best conducted using home station weekly 
SOAR training flights rather than on biannual multi-lateral training exercises.  He 
debated that SOAR instruction would better be retained on home-station missions rather 
than at off-station exercises due to the familiar mission planning experience.   
Expert 4 presented the navigator SOAR certification syllabus, roughly consisting 
of one duty day of ground training followed by one flight, and suggested applying the 
same syllabus to navigator replacements.  He additionally suggested it did not matter 
whether flights were conducted at home station or abroad.  Since the program would be 
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structured with training folders and organized with specific instruction points other flying 
certification programs, replacements would be held accountable for attaining all requisite 
SOAR expertise.   
Expert 5 agreed with Expert 4, further stating off-station SOAR exercises usually 
offered many flights over a period of weeks which might actually present more robust 
training through repetition and achieving more than the syllabus requires.  Also, Expert 5 
offered the most comprehensive training plan, including when to transition instruction of 
the program from navigators to trained third pilot replacements.  Though notional, Table 
7 illustrates Expert 5’s suggestion for training navigator replacements and eventually 
transitioning control of instruction to those replacements.   
Table 7.  Navigator Replacement Training Timeline 
 
He noted this timeline was based on home station training flights alone since off station 
exercises occur roughly twice a year but not according to a predictable timeline.  He said 
training flights take place approximately twice per week but a maximum of 18 trained 
replacements was reasonable when considering cancelled flights due to weather or 
maintenance and extra flights for students failing to grasp the instruction in a timely 
manner.  Additionally, Expert 5 suggested training fewer students at first, presumably 
initial replacement cadre, then allowing them to gain SOAR experience for two quarters 
before gradually introducing them as instructors and phasing out navigator instructors. 
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 By the end of the discussion on how to train and certify navigator replacements, 
Expert 2 and Expert 3 reached a consensus with the other experts that the existing 
navigator SOAR syllabus could be applied to navigator replacements.  They agreed 
Expert 5’s timeline sounded reasonable but would probably require real-time 
adjustments.  Also, they concluded it made sense to maximize instruction by utilizing 
both home station flights and off-station exercises to meet syllabus requirements.  
Finally, the experts reached a compromise on who should train replacements.  Whereas 
Expert 2 and Expert 3 wanted all instruction originating from the 22d Operations Group 
SOAR unit, the other experts believed the unit was too small to handle the volume of 
instruction necessary and all instructors across the flying squadrons should also be 
employed.  The solution reached involved relying on the specialized SOAR training unit 
as much as possible throughout the transition but specifically for the initial non-navigator 
replacement cadre. 
Question 7.  How will the assignment system handle KC-135 navigators from 
various year groups?  Where will they go?  How will they accrue gate months? 
Expert 1 initially stated he thought the majority of navigators would be reassigned 
to fly special operations aircraft, specifically the U-28 and AC-130, depending on how 
many years of experience they had accrued in the KC-135.  However, Expert 3 rebutted 
with further information that though there was a manning need within special operations 
over the past several years, many of those positions were filled by transitioning C-130 
legacy navigators and the need had been satisfied.  However, the projected shortage 
resided within the B-52 community.  While these two experts discussed specific job 
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openings for the majority of divested navigators, the other three experts spoke more 
broadly regarding career timing and exhausting all assignment opportunities. 
Experts 2, 4, and 5 centered the discussion on gate months, the minimum number 
of months serving in an operational flying billet required to maintain Aviation Career 
Incentive Pay (ACIP).  Primarily, those navigators who had not yet served eight years of 
operational flying would not continue to receive ACIP through 18 years of service if 
reassigned to a non-operational flying position.  Those more senior Captains and Majors 
who had fulfilled the first 96-month flying gate would likely find themselves 
transitioning to staff positions and would never return to flying again while the younger 
navigators would retrain on another aircraft or fill positions allowing them to earn their 
ACIP.  Despite saving the Air Force a significant sum of money by prohibiting some 
navigators from attaining the 96-month flying gate, the service risks retaining many of 
these officers due to demands in the private sector for their training and aviation 
experience.  This is especially true for pilots, and the Air Force has traditionally enabled 
aviators to meet this ACIP milestone in order to maintain operationally savvy personnel 
and fill rated supplement requirements. 
After exhausting the flying gate discussion, all of the experts agreed there were 
many operational flying possibilities available to the younger navigators, all of which 
they thought should be sought after to efficiently and effectively divest the force.  While 
the sharper experienced navigators could compete for undergraduate flying training 
programs to become pilots or fly unmanned aircraft, the remainder of the experienced 
instructors would most likely fill openings as CSO instructors at Naval Air Station 
 48 
Pensacola, and some would become Air Mobility Liaison Officers (AMLO).  The 
younger navigators had fewer options and would transition to fill needs in other aircraft 
such as the B-52, RC-135, MC-130, AC-130, and U-28.  Although there is a projected 
need for B-52 navigators in the coming years, there are several ways AFPC could 
apportion KC-135 navigators, including double-billeting UMD authorizations in one or 
more of the aforementioned aircraft until manning stabilizes or retaining them in the 
tanker until there are manning vacancies. 
Aside from the flying gate milestone delineating those navigators who would 
never fly again from those who would be retrained, the experts cautioned reassignment of 
too many navigators in a short timeframe.  They suggested attrition at a conservative pace 
in order to allow time for suitable openings to present themselves and make appropriate 
personnel pairings.  Additionally, the experts reached a consensus cautioning application 
of a divestment plan which would leave navigators all undergoing reassignment at the 
same time.  Such a scenario, they warned, would likely cause AFPC to inefficiently force 
shape a significant number of navigators out of the Air Force.  In other words, while 
personnel typically remain on a “Vulnerable to Move List” until AFPC can match them 
to an assignment, if the Air Force waits too long to divest navigators, then the KC-46 
could complete its beddown and eliminate all funded navigator billets.  If a large number 
of KC-135 navigators still exists at this point, the Air Force’s hand would likely be forced 
to eliminate personnel rather than pay officers without jobs to perform. 
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Summary 
Applying the Delphi method to elicit information regarding navigator divestment 
spurred on a great deal of debate and discussion.  Though there was potential for ardent 
disagreement and diverging ideas, largely the experts challenged and strengthened one 
another’s ideas to arrive at shared conclusions.  The greatest debate involved the best 
COA for navigator divestment and ultimately supported closing the pipeline of inbound 
navigators, a phased divestment with normal attrition, and recoding administrative 
navigator positions to pilot billets.  The experts also collectively agreed pragmatic 
navigator divestment called for the deactivation of one flying squadron and believed a 
pilot was the most suitable navigator replacement.  Finally, they concluded AFI 
modification was relatively trivial, standing up a SOAR transition certification program 
was straightforward and attainable, and assignments exist for all navigators, as long as 
the attrition timeline is adequate.
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
KC-135 Navigator Divestment Using the Delphi Method 
The Delphi process proved successful as a method to elicit information from a 
panel of subject matter experts without pressure to accept one another’s viewpoints.  It 
broke down complex decisions involving both objective and subjective criteria in order to 
make important decisions and arrive at well-informed conclusions.  While the determined 
results largely supported the initial hypotheses, the investigative questions stimulated 
discussion and produced much more in-depth and fact-based rationale to support the 
initial premise than expected.  The following conclusions summarize the findings of 
those research questions. 
Summary of Research Questions and Answers 
 Answer to Question 1.  How should navigators be divested from the KC-135? 
 Experts ultimately supported a COA which halts the pipeline and permanent 
change of station of inbound navigators as soon as possible, deactivates one of the four 
McConnell Air Force Base flying squadrons, introduces a SOAR transition program, and 
reassigns presently assigned navigators through normal attrition and retraining.  The 
panel also agreed it was necessary to reexamine the DOC Statement and adjust the crew 
ratio to account for the navigator divestment.  Finally, the experts suggested recoding six 
staff UMD billets from navigator positions to pilot positions in order to maintain critical 
administrative functions. 
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 Answer to Question 2.  What are potential manpower, personnel, and training effects 
after navigators are phased out? 
 The panel believed manpower would see the greatest effect due to navigator 
divestment.  Specifically, they asserted deactivation of one flying squadron as the 
appropriate COA to efficiently reorganize the flying units after the loss of 50 officers.  
Though they believed manpower losses to support personnel would be minimal, loss of a 
flying squadron would primarily reduce aviation resource management personnel.  In 
terms of personnel effects, the effects would be minimal since officers of all ranks and 
experience levels would be eliminated equally.  Finally, the training effects involved 
included the eventual shutdown of the navigator Formal Training Unit, as well as its 
associated contracted simulator instruction, and the standup of a SOAR transition training 
program to transfer control of the mission to navigator replacements. 
 Answer to Question 3.  What is the most feasible replacement for navigators in the 
SOAR mission?  What are the cost implications? 
 The panel agreed a pilot is the most feasible replacement for the navigator.  While 
cheaper, they concluded communications specialists and boom operators do not have the 
requisite training to effectively take on the SOAR mission.  One expert estimated the 
replacement of navigators with pilots saves approximately $6.5 million annually. 
Answer to Question 4.  What changes are required to Air Force regulations to 
transition the SOAR mission? 
 Among the AFIs which require modification are AFI 11-2KC-135 Volume 1, AFI 
11-2KC-135 Volume 2, and AFI 11-2KC-135 Volume 3, as well as its associated 
Addenda C.  In addition to replacing references to navigators with references to their 
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replacements, the expert panel recommended removing basic navigator and instructor 
navigator training phases from Volume 1, while redefining the SOAR certification 
program.  In Volume 2, all references to navigator evaluation criteria must be removed.  
Lastly, Volume 3 requires new explanation of the crew complement to account for 
elimination of navigators and necessity of a fourth crew member on SOAR missions. 
Answer to Question 5.  How will the Unit Manning Document (UMD) need to be 
restructured to support the new SOAR construct? 
 Quite simply, the consensus reached indicated most changes to the UMD are 
driven by DOC Statement crew ratio and PAA amendments.  The only changes due to 
restructuring of the SOAR program involve recoding critical staff positions previously 
assigned to navigators.  These six billets must change from 12M3F to 11M3F AFSCs. 
Answer to Question 6.  How will navigator replacements be trained and SOAR 
certified? 
 The experts agreed navigator replacements needed initial instruction to earn 
SOAR certification but additionally would have to eventually take over the certification 
program themselves.  They eventually reached agreement that the 22d Operations Group 
SOAR unit would begin instructing navigator replacements and would subsidize with 
outside help from flying squadron instructors.  After approximately six months gaining 
SOAR experience, navigator replacements would begin taking over instruction duties 
alongside the navigator instructors who would be phased out by the end of two years.  
This instruction would take place on both home station training missions and off-station 
exercises with a goal of eventually training about 18 navigator replacements each quarter. 
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Answer to Question 7.  How will the assignment system handle KC-135 navigators 
from various year groups?  Where will they go?  How will they accrue gate months? 
 It was agreed that the assignment system could not efficiently and effectively 
handle reassignment of all KC-135 navigators at once.  However, over a period of time 
several options exist including attending undergraduate flying training, becoming an Air 
Mobility Liaison Officer, instructing CSOs at the Formal Training Unit, retraining on 
other aircraft, or transitioning to staff or other non-operational specialties.  While many 
of these options allow for younger navigators to continue accruing gate months to earn 
ACIP, the older navigators most likely would discontinue aviation service and transition 
to staff roles or other non-aviation specialties. 
Study Limitations 
 Some of the limitations of this study included restricted access to strategic 
planning information at the Air Force level, limited knowledge of AFPC manpower 
forecasts, and lack of control over already programmed budgetary decisions affecting 
personnel decisions.  While the aforementioned solutions offer a comprehensive 
approach to efficient reallocation of KC-135 navigators, it is possible these 
recommendations could result in unintended consequences due to personnel divestment 
on other major weapons systems and higher level long term plans.  Considering 2014 
AFPC force reductions, especially among staff positions, fewer options may exist for 
reallocation of aircrew.  This study was conducted independent of findings related to the 
introduction of the KC-46 Pegasus.  It is possible, however, that the Air Force possesses 
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other informed plans which link navigator divestment to the KC-46 beddown timeline, 
despite assertions it would only impose greater risk to the SOAR mission.  Since an 
expert from AFPC was not involved in the Delphi study for this thesis, it is possible 
additional data exists which would better inform navigator divestment decisions. 
Recommendations for Action 
Based on this research, the Air Force should consider discontinuing the 
assignment of KC-135 Navigators to McConnell Air Force Base as soon as possible and 
initiate transition of the SOAR mission to pilots.  Additionally, the 22d Operations Group 
should deactivate one flying squadron, recode the UMD to retain administrative 
capabilities, request an appraisal of the DOC statement, and begin the process of 
proposing revisions to Air Force regulations and requesting manning projections from 
AFPC.  If the Air Force waits too long to divest the navigator corps, it could drive 
inefficient personnel reductions rather than carefully planned ways to capitalize on 
already trained and experienced aircrew investments.  
Recommendations for Future Research 
This research incited many ideas for future research.  Among them are studies on 
the relationship between manning and tasking of units with multiple mission sets, further 
research on how best to efficiently divest aircrew, efficacy of manpower reallocation and 
retraining programs, and minimizing redundant processes in Air Force “super” wings.  In 
order to study the relationship between manpower allocations and tasking, there is much 
to learn from how the Commanders Apportionment and Allocation Plan (CAAP) 
accounts for units with multiple mission sets or unique differences between aircraft units 
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which should drive tasking considerations.  For instance, while the SORTS is strictly a 
readiness reporting tool, is it reasonable to consider this readiness system when 
accounting for the CAAP?  Further, it is beneficial to study units whose formal training 
units are collocated with its operational units since a significant amount of its resources 
are either in training or conducting instruction for that training.   
Another recommendation for future research involves further study into how the 
Air Force divests personnel, especially aircrew in whom it has invested substantial 
resources training.  It may be necessary to study the relationship between aircrew 
divestment and the ever-repeating force reductions and growth.  Colonel John Wissler 
suggests the military appropriately prioritizes defense capability over efficiency when he 
states, “Warfare is an endeavor of absolutes, and the absolute requirement is mission 
effectiveness” (2009).  To this end, further research might investigate proper balance of 
capability and cost and at what point manpower reductions become a defense capability 
problem. 
This research alluded to former manpower reallocation and retraining programs 
like the Volant Wrench, Volant Cop, Volant Store, and Volant Van programs which 
retrained aviators into career fields with severe manning shortages.  One might suggest 
either reactivation of these programs or studies into new programs which would address 
current Air Force needs.  Such studies could also identify innovative ways to streamline 
the Air Force budget by retraining and reallocating human capital in order to increase the 
ability to recapitalize the fleet and invest in next generation defense acquisitions. 
Lastly, as the Air Force Chief of Staff calls for new ideas to streamline the force 
without sacrificing capabilities, further research into minimizing redundant processes is 
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imperative.  One such study might conduct manpower studies at bases with multiple 
squadrons of identical personnel authorizations.  This research recommended 
deactivating one of the 22d Operations Group’s four flying squadrons.  However, it 
stopped short of examining the most efficient unit manning makeup.  Each of the flying 
squadrons in this case provides identical training, scheduling, readiness, tactics, and 
safety processes, but further research could identify whether unit consolidation would 
decrease overall workload.  Since this thesis offered a comprehensive approach to 
manpower divestment, it uncovered a myriad of potential subjects for future research. 
Significance of Research 
This thesis applied data and expert opinions to determine the most pragmatic way 
to divest KC-135 SOAR navigators.  Most significantly, the conclusions of the panel of 
experts queried supported the hypothesis that current Air Force plans to continue minting 
KC-135 navigators through Fiscal Year 2017 are inefficient, problematic, and 
operationally risky.  Further, the recommended courses of action offered an avenue to 
both effectively transfer operational capabilities for the KC-135’s most complex mission 
and save costs while preserving development and employment of skilled and experienced 
aviators.  How the Air Force continues to either promote or stifle the careers of 
navigators will send a clear message to Air Force CSOs and could pose future retention 
problems if it continues to repeat past personnel management mistakes. 
This research also offers significant findings through its approach.  Dynamic 
manpower decisions do not take place in a vacuum, and reliance upon multiple experts to 
formulate long term, sensible plans is fundamental to effective management of United 
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States defense forces.  Too often the Air Force appears to take a reactive approach to 
budgetary constraints rather than a proactive approach.  This research illustrates 
application of a systems approach to thinking essential to formulation of proactive 
strategies.  While the topic of discussion in this case was a navigator, an element of the 
KC-135 Major Weapon System, thorough study of a system’s or mission’s requirements, 
needs, and capabilities is necessary to ongoing management throughout its life cycle.  
This study’s systems approach successfully applied the Delphi process to reveal potential 
divestment missteps and offer efficient, innovative, and comprehensive solutions. 
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Appendix A.  Sample DOC Statement (AFI 10-201) 
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